William & Mary Law Review
Volume 47 (2005-2006)
Issue 4 Institute of Bill of Rights Symposium: St.
George Tucker and His Influence on American
Law

Article 9

February 2006

Transforming Society Through Law: St. George Tucker, Women's
Property Rights and an Active Republican Judiciary
Mark Douglas McGarvie

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Repository Citation
Mark Douglas McGarvie, Transforming Society Through Law: St. George Tucker, Women's
Property Rights and an Active Republican Judiciary, 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1393 (2006),
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol47/iss4/9
Copyright c 2006 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship
Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr

TRANSFORMING SOCIETY THROUGH LAW:
ST. GEORGE TUCKER, WOMEN'S PROPERTY RIGHTS,
AND AN ACTIVE REPUBLICAN JUDICIARY
MARK DOUGLAS MCGARVIE*
Few people in America in the 1790s considered women to be equal
to men legally and socially. Believers in gender equality were even
rarer among elite southern males who lived in a society that relied
upon patriarchal authority and prescribed roles, behaviors, and
attitudes for its social leaders. In this context, St. George Tucker's
personal and judicial expressions of women's rights evince an
unusually progressive perspective that places him in the vanguard
of social and legal reform in the early republic. This directly rebuts
Christopher Doyle's assertions in his examination of Tucker's
commitment to gender equality and social reform.' It also raises
interesting questions regarding limits on judicial reform in the early
republic, especially those reforms sought by Republican judges.
In 1794, St. George Tucker had an opportunity, while a judge on
the district court for Accomack and Northhampton Counties on the
Eastern Shore of Virginia, to address, in Tom v. Roberts, an area of
law that he perceived to constitute a great injustice.2 The Roberts
case concerned the right of a wife, whose loyalist husband had fled
Virginia during the American Revolution, to dispose of her property
in slaves.3 Women's property rights had been the focus of extensive
* J.D., Ph.D. Teaches at the University of Richmond. Special thanks to Dave Douglas
for organizing the symposium on St. George Tucker and inviting me to participate. I also
appreciate the help given to me in the research and redrafting of this Article by Brent Tarter,
Doug Winiarski, Terri Halperin, John Grigg, Marion Winship, Philip Schwartz, John Pagan,
Carl Tobias, Hamilton Bryson, and the other participants in the symposium.
1. Christopher Doyle, Judge St. George Tucker and the Case of Tom v. Roberts: Blunting
the Revolution's Radicalismfrom Virginia'sDistrict Courts, 106 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY
419 (1998) (asserting that the role in which scholars place St. George Tucker as an early
national reformer for Jeffersonian Republicans is contradicted by his strong affinity for
patriarchal social and political traditions).
2. Id. at 426.
3. Id. at 425-26.
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post-Revolutionary reform in Virginia by 1794, but women had been

given no appreciable increase in their rights to hold property in
slaves.4 During the same year that Roberts came before him, Tucker

wrote and lectured on the inappropriateness of old colonial laws on
slavery that restrained liberal reform of property laws in the early
republic.5 His notes provide new insights into his seemingly
reactionary decision in Roberts.
Women's rights and slavery were integrally related in the early
republic. An expansion of women's rights challenged the white male
control of southern society that justified and perpetuated slavery.'
In addition, perceptions of the black man as an untamed sexual
predator served to reinforce the societal need for slave control and
male protection of female virtue.7 Generations of Americans,
beginning with his contemporaries, have lauded Tucker for his
outspoken condemnation of slavery. Tucker has been credited for his
assertiveness on this issue while Thomas Jefferson has been

condemned for his laxity,8 despite the fact that both men proposed
similar plans for eliminating the institution.9 Yet, in discussing
slaves, Tucker exhibits a racist attitude against which Jefferson's

("suspicion ...hazarded with great diffidence' that blacks were

'inferior to whites in the endowments of both mind and body"
appears mild. 10
4. Id. at 434-38.

5. See 1 St. George Tucker, Notes on Slavery in Virginia as Relating to a Species of
Property, nbk. 8, at 13-19 (1794) [hereinafter Tucker, Species of Property] (unpublished
Tucker-Coleman Papers, located at the Earl Gregg Swem Library at The College of William
and Mary).
6. See STEPHANIE MCCURRY, MASTERS OF SMALL WORLDS: YEOMAN HOUSEHOLDS,
GENDER RELATIONS, AND THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH CAROLINA LOW
COUNTRY 213-25 (1995); EDMUND S. MORGAN, AMERICAN SLAVERY-AMERICAN FREEDOM: THE
ORDEAL OF COLONIAL VIRGINIA 164-69, 304-05 (1975).
7. See JOHN W. BLASSINGAME, THE SLAVE COMMUNITY: PLANTATION LIFE IN THE
ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 136-45 (1972); WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN
ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO, 1550-1812, at 28-40 (1968).

8. See Mark D. McGarvie, "InPerfect Accordance with His Character"Thomas Jefferson,
Slavery, and the Law, 95 IND. MAG. HIST. 142, 157 (1999).
9. See id. at 163; see also ST. GEORGE TUCKER, A DISSERTATION ON SLAVERY: WITH A
PROPOSAL FOR THE GRADUAL ABOLITION OF IT, IN THE STATE OF VIRGINIA (Negro Univs. Press

1970) (1796) [hereinafter TUCKER, DISSERTATION ON SLAVERY]. Tucker and Jefferson
independently proposed the public purchase of slaves to protect slaveholders' property
interests and removal of the slaves to Africa.
10. McGarvie, supranote 8, at 157 (quoting THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF
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In one of his many writings on slavery, however, Tucker asserts
an evil associated with the institution that escaped the notice of
others, including other attorneys. In a notebook containing teaching
notes written in 1794, Tucker argued that the peculiar laws through
which people were regarded as property impeded the realization of
liberal Republican law reform, especially the ability of women to
hold and inherit property.1 Tucker referred to a law of 1727 that
confirmed the status of slaves as real property and pronounced that
the "right of a Feme covert to a slave shall vest in the husband
absolutely; that of a feme sole, on her marriage." 2 He proceeded to
criticize this law as absurdly denying women their equal rights:
The laws respecting them [slaves] are not always founded in
perfect Justice: A man marries a woman possessed of slaves in
her own Right; they become his instantly upon the marriage;
they may be taken in exemption to satisfy his previous Debts; if
he dies in the Lifetime of his wife, she shall have the use of one
third part of her own slaves, only, during her Life. [I]f he is
indebted, she shall have the use only of one third of the surplus
of them, if there be any, after payment of his Debt. She should
not presume to move them out of the State under penalty of
forfeiting her whole Dower. It is easy to perceive that these
provisions were not enacted by a female Legislature.1"
In this writing, Tucker evinces a remarkable attitude toward
women's rights and compels all students of the early republic to
VIRGINIA 150 (Frank Shuffeltan ed., Penguin Books 1999) (1787)). Tucker wrote that freed
blacks "[are] not remarkable for their Industry.... They appear to have no ambition for civil
rights." 1 St. George Tucker, Notes on the State of Slavery in Virginia, nbk. 7, at 100
(unpublished Tucker-Coleman Papers, located at the Earl Gregg Swem Library at The College
of William and Mary). Of his plan for removing black people from America, Tucker states:
This plan may savour strongly of prejudiceD; I confess I am not wholly exempt
from its influences; I wish to discourage the residence of negroes [and) mulattoes
among us: by denying them the most valuable privileges which civil government
affords, I would wish them to seek another climate more favourable to their
rights.
Id. at 102; see also TUCKER, DISSERTATION ON SLAVERY, supranote 9, at 92-94.
11. Tucker, Species of Property, supra note 5, at 13-19.
12. Id. at 15. A feme sole is an unmarried woman whereas a feme covert is a married
woman. Under the law of 1727, the need for her husband's consent limited a feme covert's
ability to convey property, and in some instances, even to hold it. Id.
13. Id. at 19.
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reconsider the profundity of the legal reform achieved by the
Republican leadership. Writing 130 years before women were given
the right to vote, Tucker certainly entertains the idea of female
lawmakers and castigates the legislature for making laws that are
unjust solely because they are biased to favor men.14 While liberal
reforms were being made to Virginia's property laws by both
legislative and judicial action, the defensiveness that already
existed around the issue of slavery precluded liberal reform from
addressing that institution. 5 Virginians could conceive of women
owning and inheriting property, so long as that property did not
take the form of slaves. In this context, Tucker condemned the
institution for impeding the progress of the legal reform that was
necessary to create a more liberal society.' 6
In 1999, Michael Grossberg published an essay in which he
described how Jeffersonian Republicans transformed Virginia law
after the Revolution to embody revolutionary ideals. 7 He argues
that reforming the inheritance law constituted one of the greatest
successes in bringing about radical change in American society.'"
Laws of 1776 and 1785 abolished entail and primogeniture, opening

14. Id. This writing is consistent with Tucker's call for suffrage rights for unmarried
women who pay taxes. See Edward Christian, Note, in 2 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE

445
(St. George Tucker ed., Lawbook Exch. 1996) (1803). Elsewhere, Tucker is quoted: "I fear
there is little reason for a compliment to our laws for their respect and favour to the female
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

sex."

LINDA K.

KERBER,

WOMEN

OF

THE

REPUBLIC:

INTELLECT

AND

IDEOLOGY

IN

REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 137 (1980).

15. Tucker, Species of Property, supra note 5, at 19 (indicating that the institution of
slavery was more sacred than life or liberty).
16. Id. (attacking the institution of slavery and the right of men to hold slaves as
property).
17. Michael Grossberg, Citizensand Families:A Jeffersonian Vision of DomesticRelations
and Generational Change, in THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE EDUCATION OF A CITIZEN 3, 3-27

(James Gilreath ed., 1999) [hereinafter Grossberg, Citizens and Families]; see also MARK
DOUGLAS McGARVIE, ONE NATION UNDER LAW: AMERICA'S EARLY NATIONAL STRUGGLES TO
SEPARATE CHURCH AND STATE 74-76 (2004). The common law's embrace of liberalism in the
early republic, expressed through the will theory of contract law, is a consistent theme
-throughout Grossberg's work. See, e.g., MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW
AND FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 20-24 (1985) [hereinafter GROSSBERG,

GOVERNING THE HEARTH] (noting that nineteenth-century contract law succumbed to laissezfaire economics and liberal politics, which led to the creation of a will theory of contracts).
18. Grossberg, Citizens and Families,supranote 17, at 3-4, 17.

20061

TRANSFORMING SOCIETY THROUGH LAW

1397

up land for use by its present holders. 9 This reform certainly
reflects the early republic's commitment to encouraging economic
development. The abolition of entail benefited creditors and debtors
by facilitating borrowing and debt collection.2 ° Land became an
economic resource that was useful in commerce. 2 ' To ideologues like
Jefferson, however, the essence of this reform was the recognition
of all children, male and female, as legal equals. Recognition of the
wife or widow as a legal individual, who should not be dependent
upon or a burden to her children, but who should be able to hold and
convey the property of her deceased husband in her own right,
logically followed.22
St. George Tucker, an ardent Republican devoted to Jefferson,
addressed the ideology at the root of these legal changes and
professed the importance of the law of 1776 in his writing, teaching,
and judicial decisionmaking. 2" He presents compelling evidence
of how broadly Jeffersonian reformers in the post-Revolutionary
Era defined the ideal of legal equality and conceived of it as a
transformative device in shaping economic, social, and sexual
relationships in the new republic.2 4 Tucker considered entail to be
"the offspring of feudal barbarism and prejudice"25-a system of
thought that was wiped out "when the Revolution took place [and]
a different mode of thinking succeeded."2" He referred to postRevolutionary law as "our" law and contrasted it with earlier
colonial laws: "whereas the rule of our law, comprehends the whole
of a man's children, or other descendants without regard to sex or

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 11-13.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 14-15.
Id. at 10, 12-14.
Id. at 19-23.
Id.
St. George Tucker, Discourse Concerning the Several Acts Directing the Course of

Descents, in Virginia, in 3 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES
OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA ed. app. 1, 19 (St. George Tucker

ed., Lawbook Exch. 1996) (1803) [hereinafter Tucker, Descents in Virginia].
26. 3 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO
THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF
THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, supra note 25, at 119 ed. n.14 [hereinafter TUCKER,
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES].
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primogeniture."" In teaching about the meaning of this change, he
used an example. In the early republic in Virginia, if a man died
intestate with a son, daughter, and grandchildren by both the son
and the daughter, all would inherit without sexual distinction,
whereas under colonial law, only the son or his issue would
inherit.2" Yet, Tucker's record as a judge evinces a position that was
just as important to Tucker and which mitigated his ability to act on
his own beliefs-the Republican perspective that judges should not
legislate from the bench. 9
Statutory reform in post-Revolutionary Virginia encountered
limitations imposed by strong public opinion rooted in acceptance of
an established slaveholding hierarchy. 0 Certainly, single women in
turn-of-the-century Virginia were free to hold slaves, but married
women were not. 1 This legal distinction provides evidence of the
South's retention of premodern patriarchal ideas that served to
legitimize the institution of slavery and to subordinate women to
their husband's, father's, or even son's, control. Holly Brewer,
discussing the law of 1727, asserts that entailing slaves to land may
have mitigated some of the growing denunciations of slavery, for "if
slaves could not be separated from an estate, they need not fear
what many considered the worst part of slavery-sale.3 2 She also
noted that
if slaves were personal property, they would be divided among
the children ....
The heir then would have to pay his younger

siblings for their value instead of being able to protect and help
them while retaining both land and slaves as rightful head of the
family.... [A]n explicit part of the justification of entail-of both
slaves and land-was the assumption that the elder son was
head over his siblings [as well as the protector of the mother]. 3

27. Tucker, Descents in Virginia,supra note 25, ed. app. at 20.
28. Id.
29. See infra notes 119-31 and accompanying text.
30. Holly Brewer, EntailingAristocracy in Colonial Wirginia: 'Ancient FeudalRestraints"
and Revolutionary Reform, 54 WM. & MARY Q. 307, 341-43 (1997).

31. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
32. Brewer, supra note 30, at 339-40.
33. Id. at 340.
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This paternalism conflicted with the prevailing understanding in
the early republic that individuals are equal, free, and autonomous
actors-an idea ultimately expressed in the widespread adoption
of contract law as a means of defining social relationships. Brewer,
in fact, contends that prerevolutionary legislators intended to
"introduce into Virginia a type of feudalism" and that many Virginia
planters still preferred an old world societal model to the individualistic reforms of the early republic.'
Other legal historians have noted how Virginia's judges hindered the commonwealth's full adoption of contract law principles.
F. Thornton Miller argues that the South resented and fought
the imposition of contract law as potentially destructive of its
premodern economy.3" Contract law gave the courts power to
overcome provincial considerations in asserting human equality and
property rights, implicitly including the right to sell one's own
labor. 6 In the North, it served as a major force in breaking down the
communitarianism of colonial society and imposing a rights-based
individualism in the early republic. 7 Echoing Miller, Timothy
Huebner notes that well into the early republic "the principle of
community interest informed southern judicial thinking about law
and the economy."3 " For example, as late as the early 1800s in
Virginia, Judge Spencer Roane stated that a corporation had no
reason to exist if its purpose was "merely private or selfish, if it
[was] detrimental to, or not promotive of, the public good."39 In
fighting for a greater appreciation of the property rights for Virginia's women based on contract law principles, Tucker confronted
an antagonistic judiciary and a society fearful of the full repercussions of adopting Jeffersonian liberalism.
Colonial laws generally affirmed social hierarchies and their
concomitant imposition of responsibilities and obligations.40 Legal
34. Id. at 339-40.
35. F. THORNTON MILLER, JURIES AND JUDGES VERSUS THE LAW: VIRGINIA'S PROVINCIAL
LEGAL PERSPECTIVE, 1738-1828, at 6-7, 12-33, 119 (1994).
36. See id. at 119.

37. See id.
38. TIMOTHY S. HUEBNER, THE SOUTHERN JUDICIAL TRADITION: STATE JUDGES AND
SECTIONAL DISTINCTIVENESS, 1790-1890, at 5 (1999).

39. Id. at 5-6 (quoting Currie's Adm'rs v. Mut. Assurance Soc'y, 14 Va. (4 Hen. & M) 315,
347-48 (1809) (Roane, J.)).
40. See Doyle, supranote 1, at 424.
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prescriptions combined with moral duties to compel social "betters"
to provide care for the needy, while simultaneously reinforcing the
decisionmaking authority to which their "inferiors" deferred. 41 This
paternalism, specifically in regard to society's protection of women,
was codified in the property law of Virginia in 1674.42 A married
woman's property could not be conveyed unless she and her
husband executed a joint deed, and the wife, in a private examination in court, acknowledged that she freely desired the transfer.43
Into the early nineteenth century, Virginia's laws on conveyance
evinced the persistence of the notion that women must be protected
from harm, thereby subordinating them to the protection and
authority of male judges. In 1797, Chief Justice Pendleton of the
Virginia Supreme Court found that "[a] feme covert can't pass her
legal title without a deed, accompanied by a privy examination, to
evince that she does not do it under her husband's influence. 44 In
1810, the fact that a conveyance was supported only by a deed
executed by a deceased woman's husband, with the record bereft of
any evidence of her private examination, formed a sufficient basis
for the court to void the transaction. 45 The Court held that the
woman "must be presumed to have been under the coercion of her
husband, without any direct evidence to the contrary. 46
To some degree, Virginia's legal protection of women through the
restriction of conveyances must be seen as anomolous. Marylynn
Salmon finds that the early republic generally produced "an
increase in women's autonomy with regard to property. 47 An

41. MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA 18 (1986).
Salmon relies upon 2 THE STATUTES AT LARGE: BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS OF
VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619, at 317 (William
Waller Hening ed., 1969) [hereinafter STATUTES AT LARGE]. A recent work disputes the

generally held assertion that women in colonial Virginia were subordinate to men, finding
that many women exerted their agency in running businesses, owning property, and
managing their own lives, often with support from courts of equity, which mitigated the
harshness of colonial laws. LINDA L. STURTz, WITHIN HER POWER: PROPERTIED WOMEN IN
COLONIAL VIRGINIA (2002).
42. SALMON, supra note 41, at 18.
43. Id. at 18-19.
44. Id. at 21 (quoting Countz v. Geiger, 5 Va. (1 Call) 191, 193 (1797)). The 1674
enactment in Virginia was a copy of a sixteenth-century English statute. Id. at 18.
45. Id. at 20-21.
46. Id. (quoting Harvey v. Pecks, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) 518, 524, 528 (1810)).
47. Id. at xvi.
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individualistic and rights-oriented ideology fueled the American
Revolution, and this same ideological perspective influenced the
laws and institutions that the new nation created. William Nelson
asserts that, "[a]lthough little legal change occurred during the war
itself, the attempts of the revolutionary generation to explain and
justify the war and its political results set loose new intellectual and
social currents which ultimately transformed the legal and social
structure of the new state." 8 Salmon identifies three specific
changes the Revolution produced in the property rights of women:
two regarding inheritance and one regarding divorce.49
Perhaps no personal legal matter better illustrates the change in
values in late-eighteenth-century America than does marriage.
First, the decision to marry became less a concern of family
economics and more a consideration of personal desire.5 ° Second,
during the Revolutionary Era and the early republic, laws reflected
a greater liberality to granting divorces.5 1 Marriage remained a
sacred union, but this understanding was tempered by protecting,
in the words of a 1775 magazine article, the "reasonable liberty" of
the two parties to the marriage "contract."5 2 A marriage contract,
like all other contracts, had to be a voluntary agreement between
two equal parties. Michael Grossberg, explaining the Jeffersonian
transformation of family law, refers to Sir Henry Maine's theory of
societal progress, which predicts that society moves from being
status based to contract based. He quotes Maine on this point,
saying that, "the individual was 'steadily being substituted for the
family as the unit of which civil laws take account."'5 3
48. WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL
CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830, at 5 (1975).
49. SALMON, supra note 41, at xv.
50. GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH, supra note 17, at 5-6.

51. See generally Nancy Cott, Divorce and the ChangingStatus of Women in Eighteenth.
Century America, in THE AMERICAN FAMILY IN SOCIAL-HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 115 (Michael

Gordon ed., 2d ed. 1978) (detailing the expanded use of divorce in Massachusetts).
52. One Cause of Uneasiness in the Married State, 1 PA. MAG. 602, 602-04 (1775).
53. Grossberg, Citizens and Families, supra note 17, at 17 (quoting SIR HENRY MAINE,
ANCIENT LAW 140 (J.H. Dent & Sons 1972) (1917)); see also SALMON, supranote 41, at 58-80
(describing the early development ofAmerican divorce law). The Virginia legislature approved
a divorce in 1803. See RODERICK PHILLIPS, PUTIING ASUNDER: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN
WESTERN SOCIETY 157 (1988) (stating that "the first divorce, by an act of the legislature, was
decreed in 1803"). But see THOMAS E. BUCKLEY, THE GREAT CATASTROPHE OF MY LIFE:

DIVORCE INTHE OLD DOMINION (2002) (arguing that divorce in antebellum Virginia continued
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The revolutionary era's abandonment of primogeniture allowed
daughters to inherit real and personal property, while the reforms
to intestacy laws recognized the rights of widows and widowers
as nearly equal.54 Certainly, these changes support Grossberg's
assertion that revolutionary-era Americans defined people as
individuals, rather than by their roles in a family. Yet, they also
indicate the attempt by Americans of this era to break down social
hierarchies and eliminate artificial preferences, such as aristocracy,
monopolies, and established churches. An egalitarian spirit infused
much of the legal reform of the early republic. In the process of
recognizing a greater equality of rights, Americans also eliminated
the social duties and expectations attached to hierarchically defined
status. Each individual became a free actor, able to make decisions
based on her or his own self-interest. In according greater respect
for the rights of daughters and widows, legal reform limited the
impositions upon sons to care for their sisters, mothers, or stepmothers.5"
Tucker felt that Virginia's laws on slavery frustrated this type of
legal reform, that is, legal reform rooted in Enlightenment conceptions of equal rights. Tucker wrote numerous essays on slavery,
testaments to his interest in the institution's history. He wrote
about the inconsistency of retaining slavery in the age of revolution,
its effects on Virginia society, and the nature of the slaves themselves. In his edited version of Blackstone's Commentaries, which
were revised to be useful to American law practitioners, Tucker
addressed the legal concern at the root of the injustice he wrote
about in 1794.56
Tucker begins his essay on the laws concerning slaves as
property in Virginia by distinguishing between "real" and "personal"
property.

to be viewed as a major personal tragedy).
54. SALMON, supra note 41, at xvi.
55. Despite the Jeffersonian reforms, Virginia was not a leader in asserting women's
property rights. In fact, Virginia did not pass a married women's property act until 1877. See
Suzanne D. Lebsock, Radical Reconstructionand the PropertyRights of Southern Women, 43
J. S. HIsT. 195, 197 (1977).
56. St. George Tucker, Summary View of the Laws Concerning Slaves, as Property in
Virginia, in 3 TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 26, ed. app. at 73-97
[hereinafter Tucker, Slaves as Property].
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The primary object of real property is land; whatever is permanently annexed to, or connected with it, or arises out of it, or
issues from it, are considered as secondary objects of the same
nature; because whilst they remain in such a state of connexion
with it, they are regarded as a part of the land itself; but when
severed from it, they cease to be considered as the objects of real
property.
The primary, and almost universal objects of personal
property are all things of a moveable and transitory nature;
which may attend the person of the owner wherever he goes. 7
He then asserts that the essential difference between real and
personal property is "founded in the nature of the objects themselves."58 Yet, what he refers to as the "incidents to real and
personal property"-those items that are annexed or connected to
the land-have their status determined by ' Jurispositivi"-positive
law--"as good policy may require." 9 This argument forms the basis
of Virginia's property laws on slavery, as Tucker demonstrates:
Thus an estate in lands, if limited for any number of years, even
a thousand, is regarded as a chattel; whilst an estate in the
precarious life of a villein [peasant tied to the land, similar to a
serf] might be an inheritance in fee simple, and as such,
considered as a real estate.... These instances demonstrate that
the incidents to real and personal property, respectively, are
merely creatures of the juris positivi, or ordinary rules of law
concerning them; and may be altered and changed to suit the
circumstances, convenience, interest and advantages of society.... Thus in England it might be for the benefit of commerce
to consider a lease for a thousand years, in lands, as a mere
chattel; and in Virginia it might have been equally for the
advantage of agriculture to consider the slave who cultivated the
land as real estate. And probably the rule of law might be
applied with as little difficulty in the one case, as in the other.'
The distinction between real and personal property was significant only in relation to other laws. Real property required written
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. ed. app. at 73.
Id.
Id. ed. app. at 73-74.
Id. ed. app. at 74.

1404

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:1393

documentation to sell or otherwise alienate, could be more easily
protected from creditors, and was subject to special treatment under
inheritance laws. For instance, Virginia's 1785 Statute of Descents
and Distributions provided that an intestate's real property
descended to his heirs, while his next of kin inherited his personal
property.6 A wife's dower interest was a lifetime estate in real
property.62 Accordingly, defining slaves as real, rather than
personal, property influenced a significant number of business
transactions and personal relationships, including those between
husband and wife, father and daughter, and brother and sister.
In 1705, the Virginia colony enacted a law that provided that "all
negroe, mulattoe, and Indian slaves ... within this dominion shall be

held, taken, and adjudged to be real estate, and not chattels, and
shall descend unto the heirs and widows of persons departing this
life according to the manner and custom of lands of inheritance held
in fee simple."' A subsequent enactment provided that slaves
tending a crop when their intestate owner died must continue in
that labor until the following December 25, when harvesting
presumably would have been completed.6 4 This law appears to
address slaves working for tenant farmers, or those loaned or leased
by their owners. It did little to affect the property status of slaves,
other than to raise a possible question regarding those slaves who
did not work their owner's land: could they ever be considered
personal property? A law enacted in 1727 addressed this issue in
considerable detail. According to Tucker, the law declared that the
1705 legislation "had been found by experience very beneficial to the
colony, yet, that mischiefs had arisen from the various constructions, and contrary judgments and opinions given upon it." 65 The

legislation, then, in pertinent part, proceeded to clarify the rights of
slaveowners to dispose of their slaves through sale, bequest, gift, or
other means, as if they were personal property, reserving the status
of slaves as real property to certain situations." Tucker understood
61. 12 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 41, at 138-40.
62. Id. at 140.
63. Tucker, Slaves as Property, supranote 56, ed. app. at 74-75 (quoting Act of 1705. ch.

3).
64. Id. ed. app. at 81 (quoting Act of 1711, ch. 2, §§ 17-18).
65. Id. ed. app. at 82 (discussing the Act of 1727, ch. 4).

66. Id. ed. app. at 83-85 (quoting Act of 1727, ch. 4). Relying upon the Act of 1727, Tucker
articulates the situations in which slaves are to be treated or regarded as real property:
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the law to create slaves as "a kind of special assets, which may not
be touched until all personal assets are completely exhausted." 7
Obviously, Virginians struggled to define slaves as property at
least as early as 1727. Yet, their concerns focused less on the
conception of human beings as property than on the ramifications
of this conception on various aspects of Virginia society. Colonial-era
legislatures struggled with this problem, and the lawmakers and
judges of the early republic inherited it. The effects of colonial-era
SECT. 5. Infants above the age of eighteen years may bequeath any slave
whereof they may be possessed, by will in writing.
SECT. 6. Declares that slaves shall not be liable to forfeiture except in such
cases, where lands, would be liable thereto.
SECT. 7. And that no executor or administratorhath, or shall have, any power
to sell or dispose of any slave or slaves, of his testator, or intestate, except for
the payment of his just debts; and then only, where there is not sufficient of the
personal estate to satisfy and pay such debts; and, in that case, it shall and may
be lawful for the executor or administrator to sell and dispose of such slave or
slaves, as shall be sufficient to raise so much money as the personal estate falls
short of the payment of the debts.
SECT. 8. A mother dying intestate and leaving slaves other than of her dower,
the heir shall be accountable to the younger children for their proportion of the
value....
SECT. 11. And whereas the true design of the said act, and the policy thereof
was, and is to preserve slaves for the use and benefit of such persons to whom
lands and tenements shall descend, be given, or devised for the better
improvement of the same, which cannot be done according to the custom of the
colony, without slaves, and therefore it may be very advantageous to estates to
establish a(method for settling slaves and their increase,so as they may go and
descend wifl lands and tenements: to which end,
SECT. 12. Itis further enacted that any person may by deed or will annex
slaves and their increase to lands and tenements in fee tail, or for life or lives;
and thereupon, the slaves so annexed shall descend, pass and go, as a part of the
freehold and inheritance, in possession, reversion, and remainder, with such
lands and tenements; And any slaves settled, conveyed or devised with the same
limitations, and in the same deed or will with lands, shall be considered as
annexed to, and shall descend, pass and go therewith, from time to time, as
before mentioned.
SECT. 13. Authorizes any tenant in tail of lands to annex slaves to his estate
therein, which shall descend under the like limitations, as if such settlement had
been made when the estate was first created.
SECT. 14 and 15. Provide that any slaves so annexed as aforesaid, and their
increase shall, notwithstanding, "be liable to be taken in execution, and sold, for
the satisfying and paying the just debts of the tenant in tail for the time being,
and such sale shall be good and effectual against him, or her, and his or her
issue, and all other persons whatsoever, claiming under such settlement."
Id.
67. Id. ed. app. at 85.
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laws addressing slavery proved particularly troubling to Tucker, as
he sought to reform post-Revolutionary Virginia into a liberal
republic. Mark Tushnet contends that, despite desires to do so, the
South was unable to keep its slavery laws separate from its other
laws." The premises upon which slave laws and non-slave laws
rested were so inconsistent that the ultimate integration of slave
laws into the jurisprudence of the South produced a distinctive form
of American law. As American law became more rational and
objective, endorsing a rights-oriented individualism, slave laws were
rooted in sentiment and subjectivity, and they protected a paternalistic communitarianism. American law generally protected rights
and liberties, whereas slave laws did not. Instead, slave laws
reinforced old ideas of deference, hierarchy, and social duty. Slave
laws subordinated individual freedoms and property rights to
colonial-era conceptions of social order.69 Southern women could not
help but be restrained by these legal constructions, their rights and
liberties subordinated to the prevailing standards of southern
society.
The provisions of the Act of 1727 that provoked Tucker's ire
provide excellent support for both Tushnet's argument and the effect
of slave laws upon women. Section 4 of the Act of 1727 provides:
And where any slave hath been, or shall be conveyed, given, or
bequeathed, or hath, or shall descend to any feme covert, the
absolute right, property and interest of such slave is thereby
vested, and shall accrue to, and be vested in, the husband of
such feme covert; and where any feme sole, is or shall be
possessed of any slave, as of her own property, the same shall
accrue to, and be absolutely vested in the husband of such feme,
when she shall marry.7 °
By this provision, any single woman who owned slaves prior to
marriage lost her interest in those slaves to her husband upon
marriage. Subsequent sections limited a wife's interest in her slaves
to her dower interest, allowing the sale of the slaves, even those
68. See generally MARK V. TUsHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY, 1810-1860:
CONSIDERATIONS OF HUMANITY AND INTEREST (1981).
69. Id. at 37, 157.
70. Tucker, Slaves as Property,supranote 56, ed. app. at 83 (quoting Act of 1727, ch. 4,

§4).
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affixed to the land, to satisfy her husband's debts. 7' Lastly, the Act
provided that a widow who believed herself aggrieved by the effects
of her deceased husband's will that grants land and slaves to an
heir-usually a male son-could choose a life interest in the dower
interest in that land and those slaves. 72 This allowed the widow, in
Tucker's words, only to "enjoy [such slaves] during her natural life,"
but not to sell or otherwise alienate the property of the designated
heir. 3
Liberal changes to Virginia's laws on inheritance and marriage,
which generally granted greater freedoms and property rights to
women, were limited, and in some instances completely overridden,
by the Commonwealth's laws on slavery. The prioritization of social
order, stemming from concerns over slavery and its threats of
violence and racial mixing, compelled the retention of slave laws
clearly at odds with the legal reforms of the early republic. In
writing his version of Blackstone's Commentaries, Tucker granted
himself the discretion to be quite critical of Virginia for retaining
these old laws:
[I]t seems impossible to assign any good reason, why the claim
of a woman, whose whole property hath probably vested in her
husband, and which may constitute the whole of the property
which he leaves, should be postponed to the claims of other
creditors, founded upon considerations neither more strictly
legal, nor equitable. This construction which I have given to the
law, has, I believe, been generally rejected; though I cannot but
think that it has been rejected without reason. For, in addition
to what I have just advanced, it may be urged, that the construction which I give to the act may be reconciled to the justice due
to legal creditors, as well as with justice to the widow, who is in
a moral light, a creditor of an higher grade, and certainly maybe
regarded as a creditor for a valuable consideration, both at law,
and in equity. For, as the right of dower does not extend beyond
the life of the widow, the slaves which survive her might, after
her death, and after satisfying her just claims, be applied to the
payment of ordinary creditors, for their just debts; whereas if the
ordinary creditor's claim be preferred to that of the widow, the
71. Id. ed. app. at 83-85 (quoting Act of 1727, ch. 4, §§ 4, 7, 17-19).
72. Id. ed. app. at 85 (quoting Act of 1727, ch. 4, §§ 20-21).
73. Id.
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any satisfaction
latter will be forever barred, and precluded from
74
for her claims, however just and equitable.
What "claims" might a widow have to her deceased husband's
estate? Tucker clearly endorsed the new conception of marriage as
a legal contract, to which a woman's dower rights serve as consideration.75
Virginia further amended its slave laws in 1730. Tucker found
that "[t]his act is but of little importance, except [as evidence of] ...
the frequent doubts and difficulties which occurred in the construction of the former acts.,7 6 The legislature made other attempts to
clarify slaves as a form of property in 1744, 1748, and 1752. 7v The
artificial and contrived definitions of slaves as a form of property
proved problematic by the mid-eighteenth century, and Tucker
found the problems only to increase over time.78
The American Revolution and the succeeding years did not
produce liberal reform in Virginia's slave laws. In fact, Tucker
describes the Act of October 1776 as asserting that husbands of
women who possessed only interests as "tenants in tail" in lands to
which slaves were annexed would have "an absolute estate in such
slaves, independent of the former right of the wife. ' 79 Legislative
enactments in 1792 and 1794 declared slaves to be both "personal
estate"' and "a kind of special assets," both undoing and confirming
the Act of 1727 at once.8 1 The law addressing wills that was enacted
in 1794 gave "to the widows of persons dying intestate, a life estate
only in the third part of the surplus of the slaves of their husbands,
after funeral debts and just expenses paid."8 2 It also "still impose [d]
the forfeiture of all her dower in her husband's estate, if any widow

74. Id. ed. app. at 86-87.
75. Id. ed. app. at 86. Tucker notes that "dower [is] both a legal and an equitable right,
founded upon a valuable consideration in law, namely, the marriage, and often upon a further
valuable consideration, in fact, namely, the portion of the wife." Id.
76. Id. ed. app. at 89.
77. Id. ed. app. at 89-92.
78. Id. ed. app. at 89-90.
79. Id. ed. app. at 92.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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remove[d], or permit[ed] [the removal of slaves] out of the commonwealth."83
The Virginia legislature's complicated and often confusing
attempts to define slaves as a form of property troubled Tucker, and
historians even today struggle to understand why generations of
legislators throughout the colonial and Republican eras went
through such elaborate legal machinations. Judicial interpretations
of the various laws provide minimal clarification. In Walden v.
Payne, Judge Lyons noted that "[s]laves from their nature are
chattels.... The law made them real estate only in particular cases,
such as descents, [and others]. '"4 Expressing the benevolent
paternalism used to justify slavery in the nineteenth-century South,
Judge Lyons found that the rationale for such laws was to "protectU
slaves from distress, or sale, where there is a sufficiency of other
personal assets to pay debts or levies."8
In writing his edition of Blackstone's Commentaries, Tucker
almost appears to surrender in his attempts to make sense of the
legislation-a serious and troubling position for a judge and
professor of law to take.
From the preceding abstract of the various laws relating to
slaves as property, it is difficult to assign to them any determinate place, either under the head of real, or personal property.
The exceptions contained in the acts declaring them to be real
estate, sufficiently demonstrate that the legislature were [sic]
aware of the difficulty of imparting to them all the properties of
real estate; and the provisions still retained in the act which
declares them to be, now, personal estate, equally shew the
aversion of the legislature to restore to them, completely, all the
properties and incidents of personal chattels."
Of particular interest is the fact that, despite the complicated
statutory history, which defined slaves first as real estate in 1705
and later as a type of chattel in 1792, the one constant is the
limitation upon married or widowed women to own slaves as
property. Tucker notes this fact and the proscriptions on a
83. Id.

84. Walden v. Payne, 2 Va. (2 Wash.) 1, 7 (1794).
85. Id.

86. Tucker, Slaves of Property,supra note 56, ed. app. at 96-97.
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woman moving slaves from Virginia in his version of Blackstone's
Commentaries.8 7 In this more formal writing, he softens the
condemnations that he freely asserted in his notebook in 1794,
asserting only that "[i]t seems difficult to reconcile these provisions
to the principle of mutual and reciprocal justice."' Yet, in both
writings, Tucker asserts that justice required treating men and
women equally with regard to their property rights, even if it did
not require abolition. One of Tucker's primary criticisms of the slave
code was its perpetuation of gender inequality within white society.
St. George Tucker's domestic life appears relatively consistent
with his progressive attitude regarding the legal rights of women.
The American Revolution constituted not only a change in government, but also the embrace of a cultural value system premised
upon Enlightenment ideals. Tucker's republicanism embodied a
philosophical approach to life, of which representative government
was one part and domestic relations another.
In the Tucker household, surprisingly little distinction was made
between male and female children. Republican parenting emphasized individuals within the family and promoted egalitarianism.
Nathaniel Beverley Tucker said of his childhood in the Tucker
household: "I was brought up among people who despised kings ...
and disclaimed authority of all sorts except the authority of laws." 9
During the revolutionary era and the early republic, the nuclear
family provided the greatest role in childrearing, as children's ties
to more distant relatives and the community lessened.9" Parenting
emphasized affection over authority, and mothers and fathers
worked together as partners in raising virtuous Republican
citizens.9 1 Linda Kerber writes that motherhood achieved a new
stature during this period, "almost as if it were a fourth branch of

87. Id. ed. app. at 97.
88. Id.
89. Linda Clark Wentworth, Childrearing in the Early Chesapeake: The Tucker Family
and the Rise of Republican Parenthood 51 (1984) (unpublished M.A. thesis, The College of
William and Mary) (on file with Earl Gregg Swem Library, The College of William and Mary).
90. Id. at 30.
91. Id. at vi, 26. Tucker boasted that not only had he never used a rod on his children, but
he had never even given them a slap with his hand. Letter from St. George Tucker to
Elizabeth Tucker Coalter (Aug. 12, 1825) (unpublished Tucker-Coleman Papers, located at
the Earl Gregg Swem Library at The College of William and Mary).
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government."9 2 Tucker's first wife, Frances, brought three sons to
the marriage, all of whom Tucker embraced as his own.93 Together
they added more children to the family.9 4 Frances regularly
communicated with her husband while he was away from home,
updating him on the children's learning, play, values, and disciplinary problems.95 Her desire to write letters may have been one reason
why Tucker's daughter, Fanny, was instructed to do the same."
Letter writing constituted an important part of a young man's
education and a gentleman's behavior.9 7 Engaging in an active
correspondence was more unusual for women in the South, even
among the gentry.9" Tucker, in part because of his frequent absences
from the home, deferred to Frances in most matters concerning the
plantation, and in particular, the slaves. 99 In 1785, Frances's
brother noted the unusual need to consult with the woman of the
house to buy some slaves: "[these] offers ... perhaps would have been

with more propriety made to Mr. Tucker but as he informed me the
proposal of hiring or buying [slaves] came from you."1" The domestic
relations between the Tuckers as husband and wife confirm the
sincerity with which Tucker advocated the increasing legal equality
for women in Virginian society.
Tucker remained steadfast in his acceptance of women's legal and
social rights, even when doing so jeopardized his relationship with
his stepsons, Richard and Jack Randolph. In 1792, Nancy Randolph,
sister-in-law of Tucker's stepson Richard and once-intended wife of
Theo, another of Tucker's stepsons, suffered either a miscarriage or

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

KERBER, supra note 14, at 200.
Wentworth, supra note 89, at 51-52.
Id. at 51.
Id. at 55-56, 61.
See id. at 3.

97. STEPHEN STOWE, INTIMACY AND THE POWER IN THE OLD SOUTH: RITUAL IN THE LIVES
OF THE PLANTERS 142-45 (1987).

98. Wentworth, supranote 89, at 3.
99. MELVIN PATRICK ELY, ISRAEL ON THE APPOMArOX: A SOUTHERN EXPERIMENT IN BLACK
FREEDOM FROM THE 1790S THROUGH THE CIVIL WAR 29 (2004); PHILLIP HAMILTON, THE
MAKING AND UNMAKING OFA REVOLUTIONARY FAMILY: THE TUCKERS OF VIRGINIA, 1752-1830,

at 59-61 (2003).
100. Letter from Theodorick Bland to Frances Tucker (Jan. 9, 1785) (unpublished TuckerColeman Papers, located at the Earl Gregg Swem Library at The College of William and

Mary).
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an abortion.'0 1 In responding to the scandal that resulted from
discovery of the incident, Tucker assumed a prominent role as
advisor to Nancy, Richard, and Judith, who was Richard's wife and
Nancy's sister. 02 In addition, Tucker orchestrated legal actions to
vindicate the reputations of those implicated in the scandal and
attempted to influence public opinion by publishing accounts of the
legal actions in newspapers and by corresponding with Virginia's
leading citizens.' His writings provide a clear indication of his
acceptance of women as autonomous legal and social actors.0 4
During a visit to Glentivar, home of Mary and Randolph
Harrison, who were close friends of Richard and Judith Randolph,
the unmarried Nancy became ill and retired early one evening.0 5
That night, Richard carried a fetus, almost certainly fathered by
Theo, out of the home and disposed of it. 106 The presence of blood,
both on Nancy's bed linens and outside of the home, alerted others
to that evening's events.0 7 Because of his presence in Nancy's room
that evening and his role in disposing of the fetus, Richard's
reputation suffered, and he was ultimately forced to defend himself
against criminal charges.0 8 People surmised that Richard may have
had sexual relations with his young sister-in-law and may have
either aborted the unborn child or killed it at birth to hide evidence
of his affair.1°
In May 1793, following Richard's acquittal on all criminal
charges, Tucker published an account of the court proceedings in
local newspapers to clear the names of those involved."0 He also
circulated the written account among Virginia's elite."' Tucker's
written account surprisingly included letters from Judith to her
older sister, Elizabeth, asserting that Richard's behavior and
101. See generally CYNTHIAA. KIERNER, SCANDAL AT BIZARRE: RUMOR AND REPUTATION IN

JEFFERSON'S AMERICA (2004) (exploring the legal and social reactions to Nancy Randolph's
miscarriage or abortion).
102. Id. at 32, 38, 40-42, 52-53.
103. Id. at 52-53, 77-80.
104. Id. at 77-80.
105. Id. at 1, 3-4.
106. Id. at 4-6.
107. Id. at 4, 6, 38.
108. Id. at 52-60.
109. Id. at 6.
110. Id. at 77-80.
111. Id. at 80.
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integrity were beyond reproach.' 12 As Professor Kierner insightfully
notes,
Tucker's version of the [story at the Bizarre plantation]
challenged conventional wisdom about relations between the
sexes in post-revolutionary America. In Tucker's tale, Richard
Randolph, a twenty-three-year-old white man, the master of a
large plantation and it corps of slaves, was the pitiable victim of
gossip and intrigue,
while his young wife Judith was his
113
foremost protector.

In subsequent years, Judith experienced financial woes, and
Nancy encountered ostracism and attacks upon her virtue from
Virginia's planter society. 114 After Richard's untimely death in 1796,
Tucker continued correspondence with both women, hosted them at
his home in Williamsburg, Virginia, and contributed financial and
emotional support to them." 5 Each woman regarded Tucker as a
father, and his support and defense of Judith and Nancy exacerbated tensions between him and another stepson, Jack. 16 Jack
agreed to run Bizarre, the widow Judith's plantation, following
Richard's death. By the early 1800s, Judith and Jack quarreled
frequently about plantation management. In 1809, Jack pressed
Judith to sell the property and she turned to Tucker for advice.
Tucker advised her that her financial problems were less severe
than Jack presented and that she could retain her plantation by
leasing the revenue-producing land to Jack, while continuing to
reside in the manor home." 7 In addition, when Jack found it
politically advantageous to distance himself from Nancy by
slandering her, Tucker took Nancy's side, publicly defending her
against his stepson's attacks." 8
The scandal and subsequent financial difficulties involving his
stepsons, Judith, and Nancy Randolph compelled Tucker to act.
Many people in similar situations sacrifice abstract principles for
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 79-80.
at 80.
at 108, 132.
at 32, 101, 132.
at 32, 114-16.
at 132.
at 114-17.
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social standing, family ties, or political expediency, but Tucker did
not. Despite being a man in the public view, he defended unpopular
women by asserting their autonomy, a view shared by only a small
minority of his peers. He knowingly elevated Judith's social role by
positioning her first as her husband's protector and second as an
autonomous and capable landowner who was competent to reject a
man's financial advice. In both instances, the status of Tucker's own
stepsons was marginally diminished by the assertion of Judith's
strength and ability. In his defense of Nancy, he more implicitly
tolerated or forgave her youthful indiscretions and once again
seemed to value the need to protect her ability to pursue personal
happiness over the interests of one of his stepsons.
Tucker brought this appreciation of women's abilities and the
justness of their legal and social autonomy to his role as judge. The
extent to which he could rely on his own perceptions of right and
wrong was limited by his acceptance of judicial restraint, however.
Tucker, along with Jefferson, detested the idea of judges legislating
from the bench.'19 During the early republic, many judges perceived
their duties as more than merely applying existing law to the
facts before them. They actively shaped and modified the law to
influence the design of their society to more closely align society
with Republican ideals.12 ° Many of these judges were Jeffersonian
Republicans who promoted a liberalization of American society that
was compatible with the political platform of their party's leader. 2 '
Yet, Jefferson castigated judges who allowed their personal political
sentiments to influence their decision making. He wrote in 1785:
"[r]elieve the judges from the rigour of text law, and permit them,
with pretorian discretion, to wander into its equity, and the whole
legal system becomes incertain.""' 2 Earlier, he had advocated that
judges should render "strict and inflexible" rulings, acting as "mere
119. St. George Tucker, Of the Several Forms of Government, in 1 TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S
COMMENTARIES, supra note 26, ed. app. at 18-19 [hereinafter Tucker, Several Forms of
Government].
120. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 11-18
(1977).
121. See, e.g., Grossberg, Citizens and Families, supra note 17, at 22-23 (providing an
example of the Virginia Supreme Court ofAppeals, including St. George Tucker, incorporating
Jeffersonian ideas when interpreting legislation).
122. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Philip Mazzei (Nov. 1785) in 9 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 67, 71 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1954) (footnote omitted).
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'
Jefferson accepted the legislature as a regularly
machine [s]. "123
elected body, expressive of the will of the people and uniquely able
to make laws.124 Tucker shared Jefferson's commitment to popular
sovereignty and the derivative importance of the popular will. He
devoted extensive attention to it in his edition of Blackstone's
Commentaries.'25 He also believed that each branch of the government was vested with distinct and exclusive powers, asserting that
"[t]he powers of government, both by the federal and state constitution, are distributed under three heads, the Legislative, Executive,
and Judiciary; and these three departments the state constitution
expressly declares shall be separate and distinct so that neither
exercise the powers properly belonging to the other." 26 Judges, as
"public functionaries," were given a public trust that they exercise
their power only in legitimate and circumscribed ways:

[I]f in a limited government the public functionaries exceed the
limits which the constitution prescribes to their powers, every
such act is an act of usurpation in the government, and, as such,
treason against the sovereignty of the people, which is thus
endeavored to be subverted, and transferred to the usurpers.
Inseparably connected with this distinction between limited
and unlimited governments, is the responsibility of the public
functionaries, and the want of such responsibility. Every
delegated authority implies a trust; responsibility follows as the
shadow does its substance. But where there is no responsibility,
authority is no longer a trust, but an act of usurpation. And
every act of usurpation is either an act of treason, or an act of
warfare.'2 7
As a professor of law and as a judge, Tucker was perhaps
especially sensitive to the need for judges in the early republic to
adhere to law and respect the democratic process. Yet, he had few
qualms, when not on the bench, with criticizing Virginia's policies
123. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Pendleton (Aug. 26,1776), in 1 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supranote 122, at 503, 505.
124. Id.
125. Grossberg, Citizens and Families, supra note 17, at 22 (discussing Tucker's version
of Blackstone's Commentaries).
126. St. George Tucker, View of the Constitution of the United States, in 1 TUCKER,
BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, supra note 26, ed. app. at 187-88.
127. Tucker, Several Forms of Government, supra note 119, ed. app. at 18-19.
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limiting women's property rights. 2 ' In his judicial rulings, he
consistently looked for lawful means to conform Virginia's practices
to the liberal legal reform initiatives. As a judge, Tucker used the
Jeffersonian changes in Virginia's law on inheritance "to create a
society opposed to aristocratic privilege and inherited distinctions
yet committed to filial equity, testamentary freedom, and enlightened morality."'29 For example, in Stones v. Keeling, Tucker wrote
that the intent of the 1785 law addressing inheritance was "to
establish the most liberal and extensive rules of succession to
estates, in favour of all, in whose favour the intestate himself, had
he made a will, might have been supposed to be influenced."13
When the law to be applied in a case was clear and incontrovertible,
however, Tucker saw it as his duty to give the legislature's enact13 1
ment its full intent.
As a judge, Tucker viewed the 1727 laws on property in slaves as
binding. In his role as a judge, he did not have the freedom that he
enjoyed in the classroom to criticize the law. One of Virginia's most
interesting cases concerning women's property rights in slaves arose
in 1809 when Tucker sat on the Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia-the court of last resort at that time. The case of Tabb v.
Archer concerned branches of the rich and powerful Randolph
family, to which Tucker had connections through marriage, and
involved attorneys Daniel Call, John Wickham, and Edmund
Randolph. 132 The court reporter allowed himself a colorful digression, unusual even for that era, in describing the case:
Few cases have occurred in which mere judicial proceedings
have been clothed in such eloquent language as was displayed in
the bills and answers in these causes. Much property was
involved in the contest; men of great talents were interested;
and it was one of those family dissensions which was well
128. KERBER, supra note 14, at 137, 277.
129. Grossberg, Citizens and Families,supra note 17, at 22.
130. Id. (citing Stones v. Keeling, 9 Va. (5 Call) 143, 144-45 (1804)).
131. Even Justice Joseph Story, an advocate of judicial positivism, recognized that judges
were restrained in shaping the law by immutable principles of reason, morality, and order.
R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICEJOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE OLD REPUBLIC

96-97 (1985). Legislative enactments that conformed to the Constitution could be similarly
restraining.
132. Tabb v. Archer, 13 Va. (3 Hen. & M.) 399, 399-404 (1809); Wentworth, supra note 89,
at 51.
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calculated to excite the passions and enlist the feelings of those
concerned.133
Tabb allowed Tucker to push legal reforms aimed at encouraging
women's property rights while still respecting existing law. The case
concerned a widow and mother who held firm convictions about her
family and its property. Although Tucker devotes little attention in
his decision to the case's complicated facts, they do provide an
interesting context for the ruling. In 1800, eighteen-year-old Mary
Tabb accepted Bathurst Randolph's marriage proposal, pending
approval by her mother, Frances Tabb.3 Mary's father, John, was
deceased. 35 Mrs. Tabb initially consented to the marriage, but
shortly thereafter asked the prospective groom to relinquish any
interest in property that Mary would bring to the marriage.3 6
Randolph discussed the matter with Mary, who expressed "decided
opposition" to the idea.'37 On the day before the scheduled marriage,
Mrs. Tabb presented Randolph with a contract in which he would
relinquish all interest in "estate both real & personal to which
[Mary] is entitled as one distributee of her late father."1 3 The
contract, on its face, secured Mrs. Tabb's family property for her
daughter and their heirs, preventing Randolph from selling or
otherwise alienating it during his lifetime.139 Randolph signed the
contract, though he later claimed to have read it hastily. 40
The next year, Dr. John Randolph Archer proposed to another one
of the Tabb girls, Frances Cook Tabb.' Mrs. Tabb objected to this
133. Tabb, 13 Va. (3 Hen. & M.) at 401. For Tucker's handwritten text of this decision, see
ST. GEORGE TucKER, 5 BOuND CASEBOOKS 696-713 (n.d.) (unpublished Tucker-Coleman
Papers, located at the Earl Gregg Swem Library at The College of William and Mary).
134. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 1, Randolph v. Randolph (unreported), rev'd sub nom.
Tabb, 13 Va. (3 Hen. & M.) at 399 (unpublished Tucker-Coleman Papers, located at the Earl
Gregg Swem Library at The College of William and Mary) (providing a summary of the facts
in the unreported case of Randolph v. Randolph, which on appeal was combined with Tabb
v. Archer).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 2.
139. Id. at 1.
140. Id.
141. Daniel Call, Randolph v. Randolph, Deposition Summary (n.d.) (unpublished TuckerColeman Papers, located at the Earl Gregg Swem Library at The College of William and
Mary).
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marriage, but ultimately assented on the condition that Archer sign
marriage articles similar to those signed by Mary's husband.' The
contract, drawn up by Attorney William B. Giles, was presented to
Archer
before the wedding, and after examining it closely, he signed
3
it.

4

Mrs. Tabb's intention in having the prospective sons-in-law sign
the marriage articles was, in the words of attorney Daniel Call, "to
vest the property [brought to their marriages by the Tabb girls] in
trustees, for the benefit of the wife, and the issue ... and failing such
issue, for the benefit of the next of kin to the wife ... [to] the

exclusion of the husband and his representatives." 4 4 Call also wrote
that the Tabb property was to "be held as an inviolable fund ... for
manner as
the use and benefit of the wife and her heirs, in the same
145
if the intended marriage should never take effect."'
The articles, executed on February 17, 1801, provided that all of
Frances's property, real and personal, which consisted of several
plantations, slaves, horses, cattle, sheep, hogs, furniture, and
146
sundry other items, were to belong to her and her heirs alone.
Dr. John Archer committed never to sell, otherwise dispose of, or
alienate the property, but rather to hold it as "an inviolablefund for
the support and maintenance of the said John and Frances, and
their issue." 47 Frances's heirs were further protected. In case John
died and she remarried, her children from that marriage could
inherit her property. Moreover, if she predeceased him and they left
no offspring from their marriage, her estate would revert to "her
next legal representatives."'" John was given49 a life estate in the
property once children were born to Frances.
Within a year, Archer and Randolph prevailed upon their wives
to support them in an elaborate scheme to transfer title in the
properties to the two men. Conveyances, in which the wives
participated, were made to third parties, who then sold the properties to Archer and Randolph, eviscerating their, respective wives'
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Tabb v. Archer, 13 Va. (3 Hen. & M.) 399, 401-03 (1809).
Id. at 415.
Id.
Id. at 403.
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interests and evading Mrs. Tabb's intentions. 0 On April 20, 1802,
John and Frances Archer sold the entire estate Frances brought to
the marriage for a sum of $20,000 to Needler Robinson.15 ' On May
21, 1802, for the token sum of five shillings, Bathurst and Mary
Randolph conveyed the whole of Mary's estate to Richard Meade,
who the next day sold it to Bathurst Randolph. 2 Mrs. Tabb
instigated the lawsuit on behalf of her grandchildren and herself. At
the trial court, the case was dismissed.'53
In 1809, when the case reached the Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia, Tucker credited Tabb for her concern and her assertion of
power within the family:
I shall only observe, that Mrs. Tabb's conduct, from the evidence, not only seems to me to stand above every possible
imputation of impropriety, but to have been highly laudable and
proper, and such as every prudent and affectionate parent,
whether father or mother, would have done well to have pursued
in such a case."
Judge Tucker wrote the lead decision for the Supreme Court of
Appeals, reversing the lower court's ruling and upholding both
marriage articles.'55 In this decision, Tucker upheld the articles as
binding contracts upon the parties and protected women's rights to
property, even when that property included slaves. His reasoning
rested not only upon the articles as contracts, but also upon
marriage itself as a contract between equal parties. 5
Tucker's ruling in the Tabb case rested on contract law theory,
which formed the backbone of liberal reform during the early
republic. Dealing with contracts allowed Tucker and other Republican judges the freedom to work within the common law, whereas in
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 404. The small sums involved in the transactions indicate that the conveyances
were intended merely as a rearrangement of title, similar to the barring of an entail to give
the life tenant the full ownership. Parents tried to tie up their property; children tried to free
it. In her desire to protect the family property for future generations, Mrs. Tabb may have
distrusted her daughters as much as she distrusted her sons-in-law.
154. Id. at 405.
155. Id. at 435.
156. Id. at 406-19.
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most cases before him, Tucker had to rely on statutory language.
Sometimes Tucker agreed with a law's statutory proscriptions, and
sometimes he clearly resented them.
In 1808, Judge Tucker and the Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia addressed the rights of female and illegitimate children to
inherit property in Rice v. Efford. The issue was whether an
illegitimate child, whose parents ultimately married, could be
recognized by her father's will and receive the benefits of a subsequently enacted statute. 51 7The daughter in question was born prior
to her parents' marriage in 1776. Effective January 1, 1787, the
Revised Code of Virginia provided that, '"[w]here a man having by
a woman one or more children, shall afterwards intermarry with
such woman, such child or children, if recognised by him, shall be
thereby legitimated."" 8
Ann Efford, daughter of Richard Rice and Judith Shurley,
brought suit to secure her inheritance. Her father died in 1799,
leaving a will that provided that his son, Thomas, would inherit his
land and that if he should die without an heir, the land would
descend to Ann.'59 When Thomas died, leaving a widow, counsel for
the defendant-appellants argued that the statute could not be
retroactively applied and that it only applied to male children,
especially as it might be used to adjudicate matters concerning real
property. 60 Tucker cut this latter argument to ribbons by asserting
that "[t]he widow of the son was not entitled to administration in
preference to the daughters,"'' thereby affirming the lower court
decision granting Ann her share of her father's lands.' 2
In another case decided that same year, however, specific
statutory language constrained Tucker from issuing what was likely
his preferred opinion. In Moore's Administrator v. Dawney, eight
slaves given by a father to his daughter as a wedding present
became the property of the daughter's husband. 8 ' Tucker held that
the husband was free to sell them at his will." Although the law in
157. Rice v. Efford, 13 Va. (3 Hen. & M.) 225, 225-26 (1808).
158. Id. at 227 n.1 (quoting VA. REVISED CODE, vol. 1, ch. 93, § 19).

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 225.
See id. at 226 (describing the appellants' argument to the district court and on appeal).
Id. at 228 n.1 (citing his notes on Stones v. Keeling).
Id. at 229.
Moore's Adm'r v. Dawney, 13 Va. (3 Hen. & M.) 127, 127 (1808).
Id. at 133.
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Virginia denied married women-feme coverts-the right to own
slaves, single women-feme soles-faced no such restriction.1 6
For example, in Braxton v. Gaines, Tucker overturned a decision
rendered by his former professor, George Wythe, and held that a
single woman could legally hold slaves independent from her
father. 6' Tucker also awarded interests in slaves to daughters
when language in testators' wills appeared subject to differing
interpretations. 167
Tucker decided Thomas, a Negro v. Edward Roberts16 years
before he rendered the aforementioned rulings from the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia. He heard the case on October 10,
1794,169 apparently at about the same time as he penned notes on
women's property rights in his notebook. 7 ° In addressing the case,
Christopher Doyle notes an existing historiography that considers
the championing of liberal reform in the early republic to have
produced a "battle in ... Virginia between insurgents seeking a more

professional, accountable, and just judiciary and conservatives who
defended the prewar system.' 17 ' He rejects such a clear division, but
still places Tucker among the defenders of southern patriarchy,
thereby implicitly positioning Tucker as challenging the assertions
of several historians who write that Republican district court judges
of the era were advocates for reform.'72 Doyle openly asserts that
Tucker held a "contradiction in ... outlook ... profess[ing] devotion to

165. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
166. Braxton v. Gaines, 14 Va. (4 Hen. & M.) 151, 151-55 (1809).
167. See Reno's Ex'rs v. Davis, 14 Va. (4 Hen. & M.) 283 (1809) (discussing whether a

slave's children passed with a will written prior to their birth); Bates v. Holman, 13 Va. (3
Hen. & M.) 502 (1809) (revoking a will).
168. Tucker referred to the case by the name Tom in his notes. See 1 St. George Tucker,
Notes on Cases in the General Court, District Court, and Court of Appeals in Virginia 1786
to 1811, nbk. 1, at 19-24 (Oct. 10, 1794) [hereinafter Tucker, Case Notes] (unpublished

Tucker-Coleman Papers, located at the Earl Gregg Swem Library at The College of William
and Mary).
169. Id.
170. See Tucker, Species of Property, supra note 5, at 19.
171. Doyle, supra note 1.

172. Id. at 420 (citing CHARLES T. CULLEN, ST. GEORGE TUCKERAND LAWIN VIRGINIA, 17721804 (1987) (published version of 1971 Ph.D. dissertation)); MILLER, supranote 35, at 24-33.
The theory that Republican judges acted as forces for reform is strongly made by Michael
Grossberg. See generally GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH, supranote 17.
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revolutionary
liberty and equality but often desir[ing] deference and
17
hierarchy."
Tom v. Roberts concerned far more than a wife's ability to hold a
legal interest in slaves. Other issues included the commonwealth's
interest in loyalist property and a master's ability to manumit
slaves. 174 Once again, the facts provide insights into Tucker's society
and an interesting context for his ruling. Roberts, a loyalist, left
Virginia in 1775,176 presumably for England, leaving behind his
wife Anne and three children for the duration of the American
Revolution. 171 In 1782, Anne Roberts granted freedom to all of the
family's slaves who had reached the age of majority. 1 77 She also
made provisions for the younger slaves to be freed upon reaching
adulthood-the males at age twenty-one and the females at age
eighteen. 1 78 Upon Humphrey's return to Virginia in 1783, he
rescinded the promises to free the minor slaves and sold one of
them, Thomas, to Edward Roberts. Thomas later sued for his
freedom upon turning twenty-one in 1793.179
Doyle astutely notes that the decision "threatened a rancorous
public debate and a hostile precedent for slave property, patriarchal
domestic ideals, and deferential politics. Therefore, attorneys on
both sides and Judge Tucker continuously appealed to community
opinion to support their view[s] of the suit.""s Yet, he omits consideration of arguably the most important indication of community
opinion, at least to a Republican such as Tucker-the legislature's
recent enactments. Roberts involved the disposal of property of
loyalists condemned by the commonwealth; but, just as importantly,
the case concerned the right of a wife to alienate her husband's
property. No change had been made in a wife's ability to hold, sell,
or free slaves, despite a host of liberal reforms that ultimately
concerned the property interests in the case at issue. In addition to
the property reforms already noted, the American Revolution also
produced sentiments leading to a liberalization of Virginia's slave
173. Doyle, supra note 1, at 423.
174. 1 Tucker, Case Notes, supra note 168, nbk. 1 at 19-24.
175. Id. at 19.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 19-20.
179. Id. at 20.
180. Doyle, supra note 1, at 434.
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laws in the decade immediately following the war. Virginians
limited the importation of slaves, allowed manumission, and even
permitted slaves to sue for their freedom in forma pauperis.18 '
In the context of these reforms, the legislature's refusal to expand
a woman's property interest in slaves is both noteworthy and
consequential. Not surprisingly, the defense attorneys highlighted
the statutory law, including limitations on the rights of a feme
covert to possess slaves in her own right or to dispose of property
jointly held. i"2 Tucker cited the defense's argument with approval
and had no discretion to rule to the contrary.1 1 3 He found that
although the Act of 1779 allowed the commonwealth to condemn
loyalist property, no confiscation occurred in instances in which
loyalist property was necessary to support a wife or children."S This
Act, therefore, did not require Roberts's estate to be confiscated."8 5
The Treaty of Peace and the Act of 1783 allowed a returning loyalist
to become a citizen and to have his rights restored. 8 6 When
addressing a wife's ability to dispose of property during the war,
Tucker was forced to rely on Chapter 4 of the Act of 1727, which
prescribed that a husband takes the benefit of his wife's slave
property "exclusively in him."18 7 Tucker then asserted that during
the war, Anne served as her husband's 'Trustee or Agent" and
therefore had no power to sell, alienate, or change his property.188
Accordingly, Tucker had to rule that Roberts controlled the destiny
of his slave, Thomas. 8 9
Tucker faced the conundrum of "how to impose the Revolution on
a patriarchal heritage."'9 Christopher Doyle resolves this quandary
by discounting Tucker's commitment to reform, arguing that
Tucker's support for the oligarchical southern way of life constituted
a greater commitment: "[s]ympathetic to revolutionary ideals, he
remained nonetheless suspicious of democratic demagogy in politics,
181. 9 STATUTESATLARGE, supra note 41, at 471-72; 11 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 41,
at 39-40; 12 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 41, at 681.
182. 1 Tucker, Case Notes, supra note 168, nbk. 1 at 20-21.
183. See id.
184. Id. at 22 (discussing Act of 1779, ch. 14).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 23 (discussing Act of 1783, ch. 17).
187. Id. at 21.
188. Id. at 23.
189. Id. at 23-24.
190. Doyle, supra note 1, at 441.
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egalitarian domestic trends, and free blacks."'9 ' It is certainly
possible that Tucker's racism presented a stronger motivating force
than his desire for women's property rights, but this supposes that
Tucker felt free to inject his personal biases into his decisions. It
also raises the question of why, in his own private papers, Tucker
would write so passionately about the inconsistency and unfairness
of slave laws denying rights to women. Moreover, his personal
relationships with Frances and the Randolph sisters counter Doyle's
assertion that Tucker was "suspicious of ...egalitarian domestic

trends." 9 2
Without a doubt, Doyle is correct in asserting that "public
opinion" influenced Tucker, which helped to form "a uniquely
southern response to the Revolution, ... buttress[ing] domestic and

political patriarchy."' 93 Doyle, however, places Tucker in service to
those social interests as part of both the southern oligarchy that
frustrated liberal reform and the southern judiciary that "reined in"
the radical potential of the Revolution.'9 4 In this sense, Doyle fails
to give credence to the possible sincerity of a committed Republican
who felt restrained by both existing law and principles of egalitarian
democracy from judicially imposing his viewpoint of a social ideal
contrary to the expressed attitudes of Virginians through their
legislature.
Tucker's unpublished essay on women's property rights and the
limitations imposed on them by Virginia's slavery laws compels a
reconsideration of Doyle's conclusions regarding Tucker's actions in
Tom v. Roberts. In writing in his own notebook, Tucker had no
reason to inflate artificially his commitment to legal reform and the
liberal Jeffersonian ideology behind it. Rather than exhibiting
Tucker's intellectual contradictions, Tom v. Roberts might better be
viewed as evidence of his commitment to the liberal Republican
ideals that celebrate both legislative enactment of the laws and
judicial restraint in overcoming expressions of popular will. Tucker's
adherence to the statutory law that he professed to despise follows
the sentiment of a Revolution that elevated law above men. As a
Republican judge, Tucker acted more powerfully to transform his
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 442.
Id. at 441.
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society than if he had vested authority in himself to make law for
the Commonwealth.
Tucker's advocacy of women's social autonomy and legal rights
raises several additional issues. In recent years, legal historians
Michael Grossberg, Marylynn Salmon, Christopher Tomlins, and
Mark Tushnet have convincingly argued that America was transformed during the early republic into an individualistic rightsoriented society by Republican judges that decided private law
disputes in state courts. 195 Yet, party leaders, including Jefferson
and many of these state court judges, spoke disparagingly of
judicial activism and saw it as a threat to democracy.' 96 Tucker's
decisionmaking offers insights into the positive role of law in the
early republic. Further analysis of Tucker's jurisprudence and its
consistency with his worldview may help historians who work to
resolve the apparent paradox between Republican understandings
of legislative supremacy and the judicial activism of the early
republic.' 7

195. See GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH, supra note 17; SALMON, supra note 41;
CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW, LABOR AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC (1993);

TUSHNET, supra note 68.
196. For an excellent development of this issue in New Hampshire during the early
republic, see JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONTROLLING THE LAW: LEGAL POLITICS IN EARLY NATIONAL
NEW HAMPSHIRE (2004).
197. Discussion of these issues will form the thesis of the author's next book, a biography
of St. George Tucker to be published by Northern Illinois University Press.

